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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20010649-CA
v.
FRANK LYLE DOMINGUEZ,
Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appealfroma conviction for murder, a first degree felony. This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to the "pour-over" provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(3)(j)
(Supp. 2001).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Should this Court reject defendant's plain error challenge to two pretrial evidentiary rulings where he provides no legal analysis to support
his claim?
No standard of review applies to this issue.

II.

Should this Court reject defendant's challenges to the admission of
evidence concerning his parole status, his prison status, and his 1996
prior conviction where he provides neither record cites nor legal
authority to support them?
No standard of review applies to these issue.

III.

Should this Court reject defendant's challenge to the admission of
Terry Brown's statements after she was found unavailable where
defendant did not preserve his claim below and does not argue plain
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal?
No standard of review applies to this issue.

IV.

Did the trial court properly reject defendant's mistrial motion where
defendant did not object while three witnesses laid the foundation for
the allegedly inadmissible evidence and then failed to request that the
jury be excused before conducting the voir dire that elicited that
evidence?
"'A trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial will not be reversed absent an

abuse of discretion.'" State v. Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, f 36,47 P.3d 115 (quoting
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 54,28 P.3d 1278).
V.

Should this Court reverse defendant's conviction based on cumulative
error where defendant has not shown that any error occurred or that
their prejudicial effect was sufficient to undermine the outcome of
defendant's trial?
No standard of review applies to this issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are dispositive of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 23, 2001, defendant was charged by amended information with murder, a

first degree felony, and with use of a firearm during the commission of that murder (R.
71). After a five-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 168-69).
Defendant was sentenced to six-years-to-life in the Utah State Prison, to run
consecutively to his sentence on a previous felony conviction (R. 183-84). Defendant
2

timely appealed (R. 186). The supreme court transferred the matter to this Court for
disposition (R. 194). After briefing by the parties was complete, defendant was appointed
new counsel (Addendum A). Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, this Court reset the
matter for rebriefing by new counsel (Addendum A).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 15, 2000, at approximately 12:30 p.m., defendant walked into the
Boulevard Market in Ogden, followed the store owner into a back room, and fatally shot
him three times in the head (R. 203:102-03, 146, 152). Defendant then returned to a
family party where he boasted of his feat (R. 203:78-80, 84, 92,102-03).
*****

Waleed Mohamd Elalawnah ("Wally"), the owner of the Boulevard Market, was
well-known in the community (R. 203:8, 10). A neighbor described him as a generous
person who had assisted her in times of need (R. 203:8). Indeed, shortly after noon on
October 15, 2000, Wally was outside his store enjoying a break, smoking a cigarette and
drinking a cup of coffee, when thisfriendpassed by (R. 203:10-11). They waved at each
other (R. 203:11).
Moments later, Wally was dead (R. 203:33-34, 39-40, 51-52). At approximately
12:30 p.m., defendant approached Wally and followed him into the store—first following
him to thefrontof the store and then to the ice-machine in a room in the back (R.
204:103, 117, 119). As Wally turned awayfromdefendant, approached the ice-machine,
knelt down, and began scooping ice cubes, he told defendant to stop threatening him and
3

that "he was going to call the police" (R. 203:224; R. 204:103-04, 111,119, 120, 167).
Defendant, angry that Wally was ignoring him, pulled a gunfromhisfrontpants pocket,
pointed it at Wally's head, and, standing just behind Wally and to hisright,opened fire
(R. 204:104, 108, 111,119-20).
As Wally began to fall, defendant kept his gun focused on Wally's head, "shooting
the gun until it stop[ed], til he c[ould]n't shoot it no more" (R. 204:104,112,119-20,
121). Three of defendant's four shots hit their target (R. 203:69,149,151-53,188-89).
One hit Wally near the right ear, traveled through his brain, and came to rest in his left
cheek (R. 203:149). A second entered behind Wally's right eye and collapsed both of his
eyes before coming to rest in his left sinus cavity (R. 203:150-51). The third shot, fired
from very close range, went from Wally's right cheek to the back of his throat, coming to
rest on the left side of Wally's neck (R. 203:153). Wally's blood spilled into the ice
bucket and splattered onto the ice machine door (R. 203:223,225). Wally died shortly
thereafter (R. 203:40,47-48,50-52).
Defendant returned to thefrontof the store, on the way hitting a white vertical
store column with his gloved hand (R. 204:105, 125). Once upfront,defendant noticed a
black gym bag with money in it (R. 204:105-06). He grabbed the bag and left the store
(R. 204:105).
After disposing of his gun, his gloves, and a paper bag he had used to store the
gun, defendant returned to his grandmother's house and re-joined the family birthday
party he had left earlier that day (R. 203:77-80, 92, 102; R. 204:126-28). After he
4

returned, his grandmother and uncle heard him dragging , . . that he had shot somebody"
to the children and family members congregated on the outside porch (R. 203:78, 10203). When police were called to the party later that day because of a family quarrel,
defendant hid in the basement of the house until they left (R. 203:84; R. 205:91-92, 161).
During a report of Wally's murder on the news later that evening, defendant's uncle heard
defendant admit that he had committed the murder (R. 203:102-03).
A few days later, police were called to a different residence because of alleged
drug activity (R. 204:60-61). The police found defendant and two women at the
residence (R. 204:61). When the police asked defendant his name, defendant told them
he was Matt Rader (R. 204:62). When defendant later admitted his true name, he was
arrested for giving false information to police and for an outstanding warrant (R. 204:62).
While held on these charges, defendant initiated contact with the police and
confessed to the Boulevard Market murder (R. 204:63-64,102-05,107-08). Subsequent
analysis of the shorts he admitted wearing during the shooting indicated the presence of
gun powder residue consistent with having recently discharged afirearm(R. 204:16-17,
50). While awaiting trial, defendant threatened a corrections officer that "someday I'll
get my hands on you and kill you like I did that other motherfucker" (R. 205:45, 51).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue I. Defendant challenges two pre-trial evidentiary rulings (1) restricting the
State's ability to reference defendant's parole status at the time he was arrested, and (2)
allowing the State to present evidence concerning defendant's incarceration at the time he
5

threatened a corrections officer. Defendant claims the evidence allowed by these rulings
was inadmissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
Because defendant did not raise his 404(b) claim below, he succeeds on appeal
only if he can show plain error. To show plain error, defendant must establish that (1) an
error occurred; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error
was prejudicial to him. Here, defendant provides no legal authority or analysis to support
his claim. Thus, he does not establish error, let alone obvious error. Consequently, his
claim fails.
Issue II. Defendant claims the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning
(I) his parole status at the time he was arrested, and (2) his prison status at the time he
threatened a corrections officer. Because defendant did not raise his claims below, they
are reviewed only for plain error. Here, defendant provides neither record cites nor legal
authority to support his claims. Thus, he does not establish error, let alone obvious error.
Consequently, his claims fail.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning details of
his 1996 conviction for a drive-by shooting. However, defendant fails to provide any
legal support for his claim. Thus, his claim fails.
Issue III. Defendant claims that the trial court erred when, after finding Teresa
Brown unavailable as a witness, it allowed Detective Weloth to testify as to statements
she made in a signed statement to police. Defendant claims that, prior to admitting the

6

statements, the court was required to consider whether they were admissible under rule
804(b)(5)(B) and (C).
Defendant did not preserve this claim below. Thus, defendant was required to
argue plain error or exceptional circumstances before his claim could be considered on
appeal. Here, defendant has not argued plain error or exceptional circumstances. Thus,
this Court should not reach his claim.
Issue IV. Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial
after the jury heard evidence concerning defendant's attempts to enter into a plea bargain.
However, defendant never objected to the three foundational witnesses who preceded the
evidence, despite their alerting defendant to the evidence sought to be admitted.
Moreover, it was defendant himself who placed evidence of his plea offer before the jury
when, in the presence of the jury, he conducted voir dire of the third witness, who had
transcribed defendant's offer. Under such circumstances, the trial court properly ruled
that any error in letting the jury know of the attempted plea bargain was invited error that
could not support a mistrial motion. Thus, defendant's claim fails.
Issue V. Defendant claims that the cumulative prejudicial effect of the errors in
this case requires reversal of his conviction. However, defendant has failed to establish
that any error occurred. Moreover, in light of the compelling evidence against him in this
case, defendant cannot show that the errors he now claims, even if they did occur, were
prejudicial. Thus, defendant's cumulative error claim fails.

7

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S PLAIN ERROR
CHALLENGE TO TWO PRE-TRIAL EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
WHERE HE PROVIDES NO LEGAL ANALYSIS TO SUPPORT HIS
CLAIM
Defendant challenges two pre-trial rulings by the trial court. First, defendant

claims the trial court erred in ruling that evidence of his parole status at the time he was
arrested and initiated a confession to police was admissible. Aplt. Br. at 21-22. Second,
he claims the trial court erred in ruling that evidence of his prison status at the time he
threatened a corrections officer was admissible. Aplt. Br. at 21-22. Defendant argues this
evidence should have been excluded under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt.
Br. at 22-24.
Because defendant did not raise this claim below, his claim succeeds on appeal
only if he can show plain error. To show plain error, defendant must demonstrate (1) that
an error occurred; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3)
that the error was prejudicial. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
Here, defendant has not adequately briefed his claim. Thus, defendant has not
shown error, let alone obvious error, in the trial court's ruling.
A.

Proceedings below

Prior to trial, the State asked the trial court for clarification on the extent to which
evidence concerning defendant's parole status at the time of his arrest and his prison
status at the time he threatened a correctional officer was admissible.
8

The State explained that defendant's murder charge arose after he had been
arrested in an unrelated incident for giving a false name to police and for an outstanding
felony warrant for abscondingfromparole (R. 201:10). On his way to the police station
after being arrested on these charges, defendant told the transporting officer that he
wanted to provide information about the Boulevard Market murder in return for not being
charged on his current violations (R. 201:10-11). Shortly thereafter, defendant "went
through a series of stories" before finally admitting that he had committed the murder
himself (R. 201:11). The State explained, "[o]bviously, in putting on that evidence, there
would need to be some explanation as to how it is we found the defendant and how it is
that conversation got started" (R. 201:11). "So that was my first question in regards to
whether or not [defendant was] keeping—intending to keepfromthe jury that he was a
parolee" (R. 201:11).
The State then explained that it also intended to present evidence concerning a
threat to a corrections officer that defendant made after he was arrested. The State
indicated that, on the date of the threat, defendant was involved in "an administrative
function" during which he became upset and threatened the officer (R. 201:12). Again,
the State argued, "[o]bviously we cannot put [the officers] on and go through any type of
a foundation of who they are and where they work and how this statement came about
without disclosing that the defendant's being housed at the Utah State Prison" (R.
201:12). Thus, the State asked for "guidance and directionfromthe Court... as to how
to proceed" (R. 201:12).
9

Defendant responded: "I think the—the first issue of why he came into—why he
came to be in—in police custody and—and gave information and was questioned on this
case in thefirstplace, I think that the State can present its evidence without having to
explain why he was there" (R. 210:12-13). Concerning the second issue, defendant
stated:
. . . Frankly, I don't—if—if they—we don't think that that
confession is necessary, but I obviously can't—we couldn't constrict
the State on how it presents its evidence and what it presents, if the
Court deems it to be relevant.
I mean, my position as defense counsel is that it's perhaps
more prejudicial than probative, but I've spoken with the defendant
about it. He understands that that information has already been out
in the newspapers and so we don't—with that, we'd just submit the
issue.
(R. 201:13). The trial court ruled:
. . . In my opinion, the second issue is the easiest. I think that
that comes in—comes in in the context in which it was made. No
one has to go into the reasons as to why he's being housed there.
That's, you know, irrelevant. The fact is that's where that statement
occurred . . . and I—I just simply think that that has to be in context.
In regards to thefirststatement in regards to being on parole,
I don't' know why that is necessary . . . . I do think that, you know,
you can discuss the discussions they had without necessarily going
into why he is on parole ...—now, if they came up in his
discussions and he brought those up, they came up in his discussions
. . . and if they bring those prejudicial things in, I don't think you
have to excise thosefromyour statement.
(R. 201:14-15).
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B.

Defendant's inadequate briefing fails to establish plain error.

Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that a defendant's
brief "shall contain . . . citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied
on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "Implicitly," that rule "requires not just bald citation to
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Wareham,
772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989). Thus, under rule 24(a)(9), this Court "'is entitled to have
the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v.
Montoya, 937 P.2d 145,150 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). .
The requirements of rule 24(a)(9) are particularly stringent when defendant raises
a claim under the plain error doctrine. Under that doctrine, a defendant must show not
only that an error occurred, but that such error should have been obvious to the trial court.
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). Defendant meets that burden
only if he can cite to "settled appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross, 951
P.2d 236,239 (Utah App. 1997); see also State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, f 22, 53
P.3d 486; State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, f 6, 18 P.3d 1123 ("To show obviousness of
the error, [defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of trial."). Thus,
failure to provide legal support is fatal to any plain error claim.

11

In this case, defendant provides no legal support for his claim. Defendant's whole
argument consists of citation to rule 404(b), a generally applicable rule of evidence, and
two cases outlining the analysis required when applying that rule. Aplt. Br. at 22-24.
Nowhere does he "cit[e] to authority" holding that rule 404(b) applies to the evidence at
issue here, let alone "develop[] that authority" and provide "reasoned analysis based
[thereon]." Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. Moreover, defendant provides no legal analysis
from which to conclude that the trial court's prison status ruling, if error at all, was not
invited error (R. 201:13 (defense counsel telling court: "I obviously can't —we couldn't
constrict the State on how it presents its evidence and what it presents, if this Court deems
it to be relevant"). See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 (Utah 1997) (holding that, "[i]f
a party through counsel... has led the trial court into error, [this Court] will then decline
to save that partyfromthe error") (citation omitted).
Without such authority, defendant can hardly establish error, let alone obvious,
uninvited, and prejudicial error. Consequently, defendant's plain error claim fails.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGES
TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING HIS
PAROLE STATUS, HIS PRISON STATUS, AND HIS 1996 PRIOR
CONVICTION WHERE HE PROVIDES NEITHER RECORD CITES
NOR LEGAL AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT THEM
Defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing the State to elicit evidence

concerning his parole status at the time he was arrested, his prison status at the time he
threatened a corrections officer, and his 1996 conviction for a drive-by shooting. Aplt.

12

Br. at 24-27. This Court should reject defendant's inadequately briefed claims because
they fail to establish error.
A.

This Court should reject defendant's inadequately briefed parole
status claim where he provides neither record cites nor legal
authority to show plain error.

Defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence
that, prior to his arrest, "defendant was wanted by the parole authorities, that he had
absconded, and that he was hiding from the police and from the parole authorities." Aplt.
Br. at 27.
Defendant claims that he preserved this claim below during a pre-trial hearing at
which the trial court ruled that, when presenting evidence concerning defendant's initial
confession, the State could not disclose that the confession arose after defendant had been
arrested for absconding from parole (R. 201:14-15). Aplt. Br. at 24-25. As set forth
below, the State adhered to the trial court's ruling when it presented no evidence of
defendant's parole status in its case-in-chief. Because the State adhered to the trial
court's ruling, defendant was required to enter a new objection if evidence of defendant's
parole status was admitted in a different context. Cf. State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, f
15, 54 P.2d 645 (holding requirement for specific, timely objection "'arises out of the trial
court's need to assess allegations by isolating relevant facts and considering them in the
context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue'" (citation omitted)). Because
defendant admits that he did not enter any new objection, he did not preserve his claim
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below. Thus, his claim is reviewed only for plain error. Because defendant's
inadequately briefed claim does not establish error, let alone obvious error, his claim fails.
1.

Proceedings below

Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that, in presenting evidence concerning
defendant's confession after he was arrested on unrelated charges on October 19, the
State could not elicit evidence concerning defendant's parole status at the time he was
arrested (R. 201:14-15, 16), Specifically, the court ruled:
. . . It isn't necessary to explain that he's on parole. You just
explain the discussion that occurred and who was present and what
the people were there for.
I think that, you know, all you can do is bring up what
the defendant brought up. I don't think you can paint the
picture of everything else(R. 201:14-15, 16).
Consistent with the trial court's ruling, the State presented no evidence during its
case-in-chief that defendant was a parolee at the time he was arrested on October 19,
2001. Officer Jason Thomas was the only officer to testify as to the events surrounding
defendant's arrest. Thomas testified that on that date, Ogden City police officers
responded to a complaint that people were using drugs infrontof children at a local
residence (R. 204:60-61). Police found defendant and two women at the residence (R.
204:61). When asked his name, defendant told Thomas he was Matt Rader (R. 204:62).
After additional questioning, defendant admitted his true name (R. 204:62). Defendant
was subsequently arrested on an outstanding warrant and for providing false information
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to the police (R. 204:62). While being transported to jail, defendant told Thomas that he
wanted to give the police information on the Boulevard Market murder so that he
wouldn't be charged on the false information and outstanding warrant (R. 204:63-64).
Thomas then explained that he could not help defendant but that he would arrange for
defendant to talk with a detective (R. 204:65-66).
Kevin Mann was the first detective to meet with defendant after his arrest (R.
206:42). Mann testified that defendant stated he wanted to give information about the
Boulevard Market murder in exchange for not going back to prison (R. 204:69). Mann,
who didn't know what defendant had been arrested for, told defendant he couldn't make
any promises (R. 204:69). Defendant subsequently accused two women of doing the
killing before eventually admitting that he was the killer (R. 204:70-77, 89-105).
In his defense, defendant called his grandfather, Frank Dominguez, Sr. (R.
205:85). On direct examination, the grandfather was asked where defendant was living
on the day of the murder (R. 205:87-88). The grandfather answered that defendant was
living with him, "He had run awayfromthe halfway house in Salt Lake" (R. 205:88, 92).
Defense counsel then asked whether the police had been called to his house during the
party held there on the day of Wally's murder (R. 205:91). The grandfather explained
that the police had been called because he and his son were fighting (R. 205:91). Counsel
then asked whether defendant left the house when the police arrived (R. 205:91-92). The
grandfather replied, "No, he hid.... Because like I told you he was away from a halfway
house" (R. 205:92).
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On cross-examination, the State asked, "And who was the parole officer that you
called to let them know that he was at your house after having run away?" (R. 205:97).
The witness responded, "I didn't call" (R. 205:98). Defendant did not object to the
State's question.
Defendant then called his father, Frank Dominguez, Jr., who was also at the party
on the day of Wally's murder (R. 205:130-31). On cross-examination, the father testified
that defendant hid when police arrived that day, that he had been "hiding out" for several
weeks, and that the father knew he was "wanted by the parole authorities" and "had
absconded" (R. 205:143-44). Again, defendant did not object.
Defendant then testified on his own behalf (R. 205:150). On direct examination,
defendant admitted that he was in prison after being convicted of theft of a firearm and
discharging afirearmfroma motor vehicle and that he had previously been incarcerated
in the State of Washington (R. 205:151). Defendant then testified that when police came
to his house on the day of the murder, he hid in the basement (R. 205:161). Defendant
explained that he "[was] hidingfromthe police" because he had "absconded from
supervision from parole" (R. 205:161),
2.

Defendant's inadequately briefed claim does not establish
error, let alone obvious error.

Defendant's second argument contains no citation to the record. See Aplt. Br. at
27. Such omission is significant because, although defendant claims the State
improperly elicited evidence uthat the defendant was wanted by the parole authorities,
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that he had absconded, and that he was hiding from the police and parole authorities/'
Aplt. Br. at 27, the State has found nothing in the record to support his claim. Rather,
as indicated above, the record shows that it was defendant, not the State, who either
elicited the challenged evidence himself or opened the door to such elicitation by his
questioning of witnesses. C/. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1232 (Utah 1998)
(rejecting defendant's evidentiary claim where "he actually opened the door concerning
these statements"); State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah App. 1997) (rejecting
challenge to state's closing argument where defendant opened door to allegedly
improper statements); State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 154 (Utah 1994). Furthermore,
the record shows that defendant used the evidence in his defense to suggest that the
reason he hid from police on the day of the murder and gave a false name to police
shortly thereafter was not because he had committed the murder but, rather, because he
had absconded from parole. Cf. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989)
(holding plain error doctrine "is in no way implicated if defense counsel consciously
elects to permit evidence to be admitted as part of a defense strategy"); State v.
Kingston, 2002 UT App 103, 1 22, 46 P.3d 761.
Moreover, defendant's brief contains no legal authority to support his claim.
Although defendant cites two cases, State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah App.
1990), and United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1987), for the
proposition that courts will consider the admission of evidence concerning details of
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prior convictions under the plain error doctrine, Aplt. Br. at 26, neither of these cases
addresses defendant's claim concerning evidence of his parole status.
Therefore, defendant's brief is insufficient to show error, let alone obvious
error. See, e.g., State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, % 22, 53 P.3d 486.
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
B.

This Court should reject defendant's inadequately briefed prison
status claim where he provides neither record cites nor legal
authority to establish plain error.

Defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing the State, in presenting evidence
concerning defendant's threat to a corrections officer, to include "information that the
defendant was in the maximum-security facility at the prison,... that he was under a
mental health watch for suicide, that the defendant was feeling homicidal, and that the
two officers were forcibly removing his clothing." Aplt. Br. at 26.
Defendant claims he preserved this claim below during a pre-trial hearing. Aplt.
Br. at 24. However, as noted below, defendant raised no objection at that hearing. Thus,
contrary to his assertion, he did not preserve this claim below. Consequently, defendant's
claim is reviewed only for plain error. As before, defendant's inadequately briefed claim
does not establish error, let alone obvious error.
1.

Proceedings below.

Before trial, the State informed the trial court of its intent to present evidence that,
while incarcerated before trial, defendant was involved in "an administrative function"

18

during which he threatened a corrections officer (R. 201:12). The State argued that,
"[o]bviously we cannot put [the officers] on and go through any type of a foundation of
who they are and where they work and how this statement came about without disclosing
that the defendant's being housed at the Utah State Prison" (R. 201:12). Thus, the State
asked for guidancefromthe court "as to how to proceed" (R. 201:12).
Defendant responded:
. . . Frankly, I don't—if—if they—we don't think that that
confession is necessary, but I obviously can't—we couldn't constrict
the State on how it presents its evidence and what it presents, if the
Court deems it to be relevant. I mean, my position as defense
counsel is that it's perhaps more prejudicial than probative, but I've
spoken with the defendant about it. He understands that that
information has already been out in the newspapers and so we
don't—with that, we'd just submit the issue.
(R. 201:13). The trial court then ruled:
. . . I think that that comes in—comes in in the context in
which it was made. No one has to go into the reasons as to why he's
being housed there. That's, you know, irrelevant. The fact is that's
where that statement occurred . . . and I—I just simply think that that
has to be in context.
(R. 201:14).
In the State's case-in-chief, Lieutenant Doug Cook, a corrections officer at the
Utah State Prison, testified that he had two meetings with defendant on April 10, 2001 (R.
205:43). The first was in connection with an offender management review, in which the
officers review an inmate's behavior to determine whether he should stay in the unit, be
moved to a different section, or be moved out of the building (R. 205:43). There was
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some discussion at that meeting that defendant should be moved to a different location (R.
205:43).
The second meeting occurred about a half-hour later when defendant requested to
speak with a crisis worker (R. 205:43-44). In preparation for that meeting, Lieutenant
Cook and Sergeant Dustin Hardcastle accompanied defendant into a conference room (R.
205:44). Then, at the request of the crisis team, the officers began to cut off defendant's
clothing "to ensure against him having anything that he could harm himself or others
with" (R. 205:45). During that process, defendant said, "Cook, some day I'll get my
hands on you and kill you like I did that other motherfucker" (R. 205:45).
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Cook, "What is the normal situation
or what kinds of things do you see—why do they make that request [to see a crisis
worker]?" (R. 205:46). When Cook responded, "I can't get into why they make the
request," defendant again asked, "What kinds of explanations? In other words, are they
feeling ill, are they suffering from a mental illness? What types of things would
precipitate them meeting with a crisis worker?" (R. 205:46). Cook then responded, uAny
time they feel homicidal or suicidal or feel that they're not mentally stable" (R. 206:46).
Based on defendant's cross-examination, the State, on re-direct, asked Lieutenant Cook if
defendant had made any statements about being suicidal, to which Cook responded "no,"
and if defendant had made any other statements about how he felt, to which Cook
responded, "[h]e indicated he was homicidal" (R. 206:49).
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The State then called Dustin Hardcastle, also a corrections officer at the prison (R.
205:50). Hardcastle testified only that he overheard defendant's threat to Cook (R.
205:51).
On direct examination, defendant testified that, while incarcerated, he was
subjected to an offender management review three times (R. 205:188). He also testified
that, while at the prison, he was housed in "maximum security" or "super max" (R.
205:188-89). He then claimed he never threatened Officer Cook (R. 205:189).

He

only said, "I didn't fucking do anything flicking wrong to be in this fucking building" (R.
205:190).
2.

Defendant's inadequately briefed claim does not establish
error, let alone obvious error.

Defendant's argument here contains one citation to the record. See Aplt. Br. at
26. The omission of additional cites is significant because, although defendant claims
the State improperly elicited evidence "that the defendant was in the maximum-security
facility at the prison, . . . that he was under a mental health watch for suicide, . .. and
that the two officers were forcibly removing his clothing," Aplt. Br. at 26, the State
has found nothing in the record to support these claims. Rather, as the record above
indicates, it was defendant, not the State, who disclosed that he was being held in
maximum security. Cf. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (holding that
%6

[i]f a party through counsel . . . has led the trial court into error, [this Court] will then

decline to save that party from the error"). Moreover, it was defendant, not the State,
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that initiated discussion of defendant's mental state at the time he threatened Officer
Cook. Cf State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1232 (Utah 1998) (rejecting defendant's
evidentiary claim where "he actually opened the door concerning these statements");
State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah App. 1997; State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149,
154 (Utah 1994).
Defendant also provides no legal analysis to support this claim. Although
defendant cites two cases, State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah App. 1990), and
United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that
courts will consider the admission of evidence concerning details of prior convictions
under the plain error doctrine, see Aplt. Br. at 26, neither of these cases addresses
defendant's claim concerning evidence of his prison status.
Therefore, defendant's brief is insufficient to show error, let alone obvious
error. See, e.g., State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, 1 22, 53 P.3d 486.
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
C.

This Court should reject defendant's claim concerning his 1996
conviction for a drive-by shooting where he provides no legal
authority or analysis to support it

Defendant claims the trial court improperly allowed Officer Rocky Gallegos to
testify concerning his 1996 conviction for a drive-by shooting of a dwelling because "the
details of the shooting were explored before the jury." Aplt. Br. at 27.
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Defendant contends he preserved this claim below during a pre-trial hearing. Br.
at 24. However, evidence concerning defendant's 1996 conviction was never addressed
at that hearing (R. 201 :passim). Notwithstanding, defendant did apparently object during
an unrecorded sidebar to the State's questioning defendant concerning his role in the
drive-by shooting (R. 205:211, 222).
A trial court's evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See State v. Eberwein, 2001 UT App 71, f 9, 21 P.3d 1139. Here, defendant's
inadequately briefed claim does not establish an abuse of discretion.
1.

Proceedings below.

The only reference in the State's case-in-chief to any of defendant's prior
convictions was a passing reference during Detective Mann's testimony that defendant
wanted to give information concerning Wally's murder in exchange for not going back
to prison (R. 204:69).
Defendant then called his grandfather as his first witness (R. 205:85). On direct
examination, the grandfather testified that defendant was staying with him on the day of
the murder because he had run away from a half-way house (R. 205:88). On crossexamination, the State asked the grandfather whether he had called parole authorities to
report defendant's half-way house departure (R. 205:97). The State asked a similar
question of defendant's father (R. 205:143-44).
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Defendant then testified in his own defense. Defendant opened his testimony by
admitting that he had been convicted in 1996 of a drive-by shooting and that he had
previously been incarcerated in Washington State (R. 205:151). Defendant testified
that, on the day of Wally's murder, when his relatives heard him talking about a
shooting, "[i]t was misunderstood what I said" (R. 205:162). Defendant explained that
"[w]e were talking about what I went to prison for" (R. 205:162). Defendant further
explained that he had gone to prison for "discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle"
(R. 205:163). When defense counsel asked, "Did you discharge that firearm toward
anybody?" defendant responded, "I was in the car. I didn't do the actual shooting" (R.
205:163). On cross-examination, defendant admitted that he initially told police in
1996 that "I know something about this case because I was there, but I didn't do it" (R.
205:212). Defendant then testified, "I did not tell on my partners. They gave me a
plea bargain and I took the plea bargain. . . . I didn't tell on my crime partners" (R.
205:212).
After defendant's testimony, the court noted for the record that it had previously
ruled that the State could ask defendant questions concerning his 1996 conviction
because "first of all the court felt that that door had been opened by the defense because
they went into the fact that Mr. Dominguez had denied being the shooter in that
particular case" (R. 205:221). Thus, the court "was persuaded that it was an issue of
credibility" (R. 205:221). Finally, "the limited manner in which [the prosecutor]
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wanted to go into it I felt balanced out as both being relevant and material and not
overly prejudicial" (R. 205:221).
In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of Officer Rocky Gallegos, who
had investigated the drive-by shooting of a dwelling for which defendant had been
convicted (R. 206:31-32). Officer Gallegos testified first that no one was hurt in the
incident (R. 206:32). He then testified that he had interviewed defendant in connection
with the crime and that defendant initially blamed two other people for the shootings,
which were directed at two different homes (R. 206:33-35). A few months later,
however, defendant admitted in a written statement that he was the person who had
done the shooting (R. 206:38-39).
2.

This Court should reject defendant's claim as inadequately
briefed.

Defendant's argument cites to two cases, State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821
(Utah App. 1990), and United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1987), as
observing that "[generally, inquiry into the details of prior convictions has been found
to be so prejudicial as to amount to plain error" and "[i]n such cases, the court will
reach the issue on appeal despite the lack of objection." See Aplt. Br. at 26.
However, defendant nowhere develops that authority nor provides reasoned analysis
based thereon. Thus, he provides no explanation of how Tucker's observations support
his claim. Consequently, he fails to establish any abuse of discretion in the trial court's
ruling. See State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 1 33, 994 P.2d 177 ("[Cjourts will not find
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plain error if the defendant explores the details of his prior convictions on direct
examination or attempts to explain away the crime"); Tucker, 800 P.2d at 823 (holding,
"[w]hen a defendant on direct examination 'attempts to . . . minimize his guilt/ a
defendant may then 4be cross-examined on any facts which are relevant to the direct
examination") (citations omitted); see also State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah
1982) (holding inquiry into details of prior conviction, though error, was harmless).
Therefore, defendant's claim fails.
III.

THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE
TO THE ADMISSION OF TERRY BROWN'S STATEMENTS
AFTER SHE WAS FOUND UNAVAILABLE WHERE DEFENDANT
DID NOT PRESERVE THIS CLAIM BELOW AND DOES NOT
ARGUE PLAIN ERROR OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
ON APPEAL
Defendant claims "the trial court commit[ted] reversible error in allowing hearsay

testimony by Detective Weloth of statements allegedly made by [defendant to] Teresa
(Terry) Brown/' Aplt. Br. at 27 (capitalization omitted). Defendant claims the evidence
should have been excluded because it did not meet the requirements of rule 804(b)(5)(B)
and (C), Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Br. at 30. Because defendant did not raise this
claim below and does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances, this Court
should refuse to consider this claim on appeal.
A.

Proceedings below.

At trial, Terry Brown was called as a witness by the State (R. 203:115). Terry
admitted knowing defendant, meeting him at his aunt's home on October 15, 2000, and
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giving him and a friend a ride to Roy that evening (R. 203:116). The prosecutor then
asked, "In the course of that ride, what statements did this defendant make to you about
activities he had been engaged in?" (R. 203:116). Terry refused to answer (R. 203:116).
The prosecutor then asked, "Has someone threatened you, Ma'am?" (R. 203:117). Terry
did not respond (R. 203:117). Terry then testified that she had spoken with Detective
David Weloth about the statements defendant had made to her on the ride to Roy (R.
203:117). However, she again refused to testify as to what those statements were (R.
203:118-19). When Terry continued her refusal despite ordersfromthe court to respond,
the trial court held Terry in contempt and then excused the jury (R. 203:118-119).
Outside the jury's presence, the prosecutor asked the trial court to find Terry
"unavailable so we may put on her prior statement to Detective Weloth" (R. 203:121).
Defendant's only objection was, "It's not anything that we have done. I am
concerned—so we do object to that, for the record" (R. 203:121). Defendant then
focused his attention on the prosecutor's question concerning whether Terry had been
threatened, asking that, absent evidence of an actual threat, "that question be stricken and
the jury be instructed to disregard that question" (R. 203:121, 123-24, 125). Although
defendant did note, during that discussion, that "we had no idea she was on the witness
list for the State until Tuesday," he never objected to Terry's testimony, or her
unavailability, on that basis (R. 203:123). The court and defendant only discussed the
State's reference to a threat and the need to provide a curative instruction striking that
reference (R. 203:125-27).
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Following this discussion, the trial court, based on Terry's refusal to answer the
prosecutor's questions, made "a specific finding under the rule that she [was]
unavailable" (R. 203:127). The Court then stated, "[S]o I think the State would be
allowed at this point to call Officer Weloth and relate those statements" previously given
by Terry (R. 203:128). Defendant stated only, "I just want the record to be clear that
we've objected just in case there is an issue" (R. 203:128). When the trial court asked
whether there was "anything else we need to cover," defendant raised no further issues
(R. 203:128).
B.

This Court should reject defendant's unpreserved claim where
he argues neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances on
appeal.

The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or some
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court
record before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal.'" State v. Johnson,
114 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah
1987)); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. The objection at trial
must "'be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error'" of which
defendant now complains so that the court "'might have the opportunity to correct [it] if
[the court] deems it proper.'" Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457,
460 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted).
This preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate,
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2000 UT 74, at f 11. Where defendant "does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances'
or 'plain error' justifies a review of the issue, [this Court will] decline to consider it on
appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted); see
also State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994).
Here, defendant failed to preserve this claim in the trial court. Although he
objected to afindingthat Terry was unavailable because "[i]t's not anything that we have
done," (R. 203:121), defendant never objected to the admissibility of Terry's statements
under rule 804(b)(5)(B) and (C).
Furthermore, defendant does not allege plain error or exceptional circumstances on
appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 27-30:
Because defendant failed to preserve this issue for review, and fails to argue either
plain error or exceptional circumstances, this Court should not reach the merits of this
claim. Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5; Jennings, 875 P.2d at 570.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S
MISTRIAL MOTION WHERE DEFENDANT DID NOT OBJECT
WHILE THREE WITNESSES LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR THE
ALLEGEDLY INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AND THEN FAILED
TO REQUEST THAT THE JURY BE EXCUSED BEFORE
CONDUCTING THE VOIR DIRE THAT ACTUALLY ELICITED
THAT EVIDENCE
Defendant claims that "the trial court improperly denfied] [his] motion for mistrial

after evidence of plea negotiationfs] was presented to the jury." Aplt. Br. at 31
(capitalization omitted). However, because defendant invited the error upon which his
motion was based, the trial court properly denied it.
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"'A trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial will not be reversed absent an
abuse of discretion.'" State v. Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, f 36,47 P.3d 115 (quoting
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 54, 28 P.3d 1278).
A.

Proceedings below

The first witness called on the fourth day of trial was Sergeant Valentine (R.
205:3). Sergeant Valentine testified that on October 24,2000, he received a callfromthe
county jail indicating that defendant "wished to speak to a detective because he wanted to
confess to a crime" (R. 205:4). The Sergeant arranged for defendant to meet with
Detective Lucas (R. 205:4-5). About twenty minutes later, Sergeant Valentine met with
Sergeant Rodefer, Detective Lucas, and defendant in a video courtroom (R. 205:5-6). At
that time, Detective Lucas began to review with defendant his constitutionalrights(R.
205:7). State's Exhibit 33 is a list of therightsreviewed with defendant (R. 205:6-7).
Defendant indicated that he understood hisrightsand placed his initials beside each of the
rights listed (R. 205:8-9). Sergeant Valentine then left the room (R. 205:10).
Defense counsel raised only one objection to Sergeant Valentine's testimony.
Specifically, counsel objected when Sergeant Valentine attempted to read the rights
contained in Exhibit 33 (R. 205:7). Counsel explained, "Apparently this document was
written by Detective Lucas and he's here to testify" (R. 205:7). On cross-examination,
defense counsel asked Sergeant Valentine if defendant ever confessed to him (R. 205:12).
The Sergeant replied, "No" (R. 205:12).

30

The State then called Sergeant Rodefer to testify (R. 205:14). Sergeant Rodefer
testified that, on October 24, he had met defendant in a holding cell just prior to their
meeting with Detective Lucas (R. 205:15). He subsequently accompanied defendant to
the video courtroom where they met with Sergeant Valentine and Detective Lucas (R.
205:15-16). Sergeant Rodefer then confirmed that the first sheet of paper in State's
Exhibit 33 contained the list of rights reviewed with defendant and his initials indicating
he understood those rights (R. 205:16-17). The second sheet of paper in that exhibit
"was written out during the interview process with inmate Dominguez" (R. 205:16). It
reflects "word for word" the statements defendant made during his conversation with
Detective Lucas (R. 205:19). Detective Lucas would write down defendant's statements
and then have defendant place his initials next to them (R. 205:20). Defendant then also
signed the paper at the end of the interview (R. 205:20).
Defense counsel raised only two objections to Sergeant Rodefer's testimony.
When the State asked the Sergeant how defendant appeared during the interview and the
witness testified that "[h]e knew what was—where he was at," counsel objected to that
statement as "speculation" (R. 205:18). Then, when the State asked, "When the
defendant made these statementsf,] did he appear to know what he was talking about?"
counsel objected because the question "[cjalls for speculation" (R. 205:21). On crossexamination, counsel confirmed that Detective Lucas had produced the statement
contained in Exhibit 33 and that the conversation with defendant had not been videotaped
(R. 205:21-22).
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The State then called Detective Lucas (R. 205:23). Detective Lucas testified that
he met with defendant, Sergeant Valentine, and Sergeant Rodefer on October 24 after
learning that defendant wanted to confess to a murder (R. 205:24-26). Detective Lucas
testified that thefirstthing he did was to review with defendant the rights listed on the
first sheet of Exhibit 33 and to confirm with defendant that it was he who had initiated the
meeting (R. 205:28-29). Sergeant Valentine then left the room (R. 205:30).
At that point in Detective Lucas's testimony, defense counsel asked to voir dire the
witness (R. 205:31). Counsel did not ask that the jury be excused before doing so (R.
205:31). Counsel first asked the Detective if he knew whether defendant had been
appointed an attorney prior to the October 24th interview (R. 205:31-32). The following
exchange ensued
Counsel:

Okay. Did you write down every relevant statement that he
made?

Detective:

Yes. I wrote down word for word actually. I said, okay, what
do you want to say, then I started to write down what he said.
He said Pm willing to plead to first degree murder, but there's
two things that I want.

Counsel:

At this point Til ask you, it's true, is it not, that he did not
actually confess to murder in the sense that he said I murdered
someone?

State:

Where is the voir dire?

Court:

I agree.

Counsel:

That is it, Judge. If the defendant did not confess to anything
—this appears to be an attempt to negotiate and that is not
admissible. From all appearances, the defendant was
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representing himself as his own attorney. Any attempt to
negotiate is inadmissible to the jury. From my reading of the
second page there's no confession here, only an attempt to
negotiate a plea.
State:

The fact that the defendant doesn't say I'm guilty we do not
believe doesn't mean that this isn't a confession. He said, as
Detective Lucas said, I'm willing to plead guilty to first
degree murder.

Counsel:

In exchange for other favors. That is an attempt to negotiate a
plea and is not admissible.

Court:

We'll take a short recess, Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury. I
need to take further discussion on this matter outside your
presence.

(R. 205:32-33).
After the jury was excused, the court heard additional argument (R. 205:33-36).
The court then held that defendant's statements were inadmissible because they
constituted a plea discussion under rule 410, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 205:36). The
court denied defendant's subsequent motion for a mistrial, stating:
. . . You solicited that. Both of you take a risk when you
decide to make these kinds of determinations before the jury. I think
this is something that we should have taken outside the presence of
the jury.
. . . [I]t's not my job to protect either side from themselves in
this particular situation. Either one of you could have asked to have
the jury excused at that particular time. .. .
(R. 205:38). Defendant then noted for the record that Detective Lucas's response
disclosing defendant's plea offer "was nonresponsive" to the actual question asked (R.
205:38). The court reiterated, "Like I said, both sides run a great deal of risk on
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something that is what I consider to be, you know, controversial in the sense of whether
or not it's admissible infrontof the jury or not

If you want a curative instruction I'll

give you one, but I'll deny the motion for a mistrial" (R. 205:39).
When the jury returned, the court stated:
You heard testimony from Detective Lucas concerning a
statement that was made by Mr. Dominguez in regards to his
willingness to plead guilty. You are instructed at this point to please
disregard that statement in its entirety. That is not a statement that is
to be considered by you in your deliberations or in your discussions
concerning this particular case.
(R. 205:41).
B.

The trial court properly denied defendant's mistrial motion
where defendant created the grounds upon which it was based.

The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that our courts will not save a
defendant from harms at trial caused by his own action. Thus, our courts have
consistently held that,4" if [defendant] disputefs] the competency of [any] evidence
[offered at trial], he should make his objection at the earliest reasonable opportunity/"
State v. Belgard, 811 P.2d 211,214 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Tuttle, 16 Utah 2d 288,
292, 399 P.2d 580, 582 (1965)), reversed and remanded on other grounds, 830 P.2d 264
(Utah 1992); see also State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 561 (Utah 1987). "'He [is] not...
permitted to wait until the questioned evidence was before the jury and . . . then claim that
it was not admissible.'" Belgard, 811 P.2d at 214 (quoting Turtle, 399 P.2d at 582).
Along the same line, our courts have consistently held that "'a party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing
34

the error/" State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, \ 54, 989 P.2d 1091 (quoting State v.
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)); see also State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343
(Utah 1997).
The purpose of these rules is simple: they 4"prohibit[] a partyfromsetting up an
error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal.'" State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205
(Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Henderson, 792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1990)).
These same rules apply to motions for mistrial. See State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256,
262 (Utah App. 1995) (rejecting defendant's claim that trial court improperly denied his
mistrial motion where "defendant invited the potential error of which he now complains"
by "declining] to avoid [it]"); cf. State v. Barney, 681 P.2d 1230, 1231-32 (Utah 1984);
Ruth v. State, 757 A.2d 152, 160 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) ("[A] defendant who himself
invites or creates error cannot obtain a benefit—mistrial or reversal—from that error.").
These rules defeat defendant's claim. First, three witnesses—Sergeant Valentine,
Sergeant Rodefer, and Detective Lucas—were called to lay foundation for the statement
defendant gave police on October 24,2000. Because defendant was the one who gave the
statement, one can assume defendant was aware of its contents. Moreover, during the
first witness's testimony, a copy of defendant's statement was offered as an exhibit, and it
is clear that defendant read the statement because he referred to it later during his voir
dire of Detective Lucas (R. 205:33). Yet, despite his awareness of the evidence the State
was preparing to elicit, defendant never objected to the anticipated evidence during the
witnesses' foundational testimony.
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In addition, although defendant knew Detective Lucas was the witness who would
actually present the evidence subsequently challenged, defendant did nothing to avoid
having that evidence brought before the jury. Rather, he actually elicited it on voir dire in
the jury's presence (R. 205:31-33). Even then, defendant did not object to the detective's
response (R. 205:32). Rather, he continued to question the witness until the State
objected (R. 205:32). Only then did defendant raise his rule 410 claim, doing so still in
the jury's presence (R. 205:32-33).
On this record, defendant clearly had the opportunity to avoid the error upon which
his mistrial motion was based. He could have objected to the anticipated evidence as
soon as the State began laying foundation for it, or he could have requested a hearing
outside the presence of the jury before questioning Detective Lucas further as to what
occurred at the October 24 meeting. Defendant did neither. Thus, "defendant invited the
potential error of which he now complains" by "declining] to avoid [it]." Price, 909
P.2d 256, 262 (Utah App. 1995).
Under such circumstances, the trial court properly denied defendant's mistrial
motion. See id.; see also State v. Wragg, 1(A A.2d 216,220 (Conn. App. 2001)
(affirming denial of mistrial motion where counsel should have anticipated witness's
testimony and 44yet counsel made no effort to interrupt [that] testimony"); State v.
Atkinson, 864 P.2d 654, 659 (Idaho App. 1993) (affirming denial of mistrial motion,
holding "[a] misstep on dangerous ground, where counsel has voluntarily ventured but is
unsure of possible responses, may result in invited error, and if so, cannot then be grounds
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for a mistrial"); State v. Howard, 293 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1980) (affirming denial of
mistrial motion where "[the prosecutor's] questions leading up to the question eliciting
the evidence should have put defendant on notice that she was about to elicit the
evidence" and yet "defense counsel delayed objecting until afterward"); Wilson v. State,
44 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Tex. App. 2001) (affirming denial of mistrial motion where, despite
the opportunity to do so, defendant did not object to the offensive evidence until after it
was elicited and "did not present any reason to justify his delayed objection").1
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.

*In making its invited error argument, the State in no way concedes that
defendant's October 24th statements were inadmissible under rule 410, Utah Rules of
Evidence. Rule 410, in relevant part, excludes only statements "made in the course of
plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority
" Utah R. Evid.
410(4) (emphasis added). In this case, no attorney for the prosecuting authority was
present when defendant made his statements. Thus, his statements were admissible under
rule 410. See Utah R. Evid. 410(4); see also State v. Anderson, 866 P.2d 327, 330-32
(N.M. 1993) (interpreting rule not to require exclusion of plea offers made to police
officers after administration of Miranda warnings unless court finds "that the statements
were made with the belief that they could not be 'held against' the declarant"); People v.
Rollins, 759 P.2d 816, 818 (Colo. App. 1988) (holding "spontaneous statements made by
an arrestee to an officer other than a prosecuting attorney are not inadmissible 'plea
negotiations'"); State v. Taylor, 336 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Iowa 1983) (holding defendant's
statement that he was willing to plead guilty, made to police after administration of
Miranda warnings, was not inadmissible plea negotiation). Consequently, defendant
cannot show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his mistrial motion. See
State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291, f 11, 55 P.3d 1158 (holding appellate court may affirm
trial court ruling on any basis apparent on the record even if not relied upon below).
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V.

EVEN IF ERROR DID OCCUR BELOW, DEFENDANT CANNOT
SHOW PREJUDICE WHERE THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE
AGAINST HIM IS COMPELLING
Defendant claims that uthe cumulative effect" of the errors he alleges on appeal

"constitute harm to the defendant and require reversal.1' Aplt. Br. at 32, 37. Defendant's
claim lacks merit.
The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal "only if the cumulative effect of
the several errors undermines . . . confidence that a fair trial was had." State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); State v.
Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 617 (Utah App. 1997).
Here, as explained above, defendant has not established that any errors occurred*
See Points I-IV, supra.
Moreover, even if errors did occur, defendant cannot establish that such errors,
individually or collectively, were harmful. Even absent the evidence challenged on
appeal, evidence of defendant's guilt was compelling:
1.

Waleed Mahamd Elalawnah ("Wally") was shot to death while
bending over an ice machine in his store, Boulevard Market, at about
12:30 p.m. on October 15,2000 (R. 203:33-34, 39-40, 51-52,
102-03,145-53,224).

2.

A glove mark was found on a column of the Boulevard Market (R.
203:232-33,247).

3.

Ricarla Dominguez, defendant's grandmother, told police that
defendant had left a family party around noon on October 15 and,
when she saw him again later that afternoon, he was bragging to
children that he had committed the murder (R. 203:78-79, 80, 90,
92).
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John Dominguez, defendant's uncle, was at the family party on
October 15, 2000, and heard defendant "bragging . . . that he had
shot somebody" (R. 203:102). When a news report came on about
Wally's murder later that evening, John heard defendant admit he
had done it (R. 203:102-03).
When police were called to the party on an unrelated matter later that
day, defendant hid in the basement until they were gone (R. 203:84;
R. 205:92, 161).
Four days after the murder, police were called to investigate a
residence after receiving a complaint about drug use (R. 204:60-61).
Officer's found defendant at the residence (R. 204:61). When they
asked defendant his name, he initially identified himself as Matt
Rader (R. 204:62). He was subsequently arrested for providing false
information to the police (R. 204:62).
On the way to jail, defendant told the transporting officer that he had
information concerning Wally's murder (R. 204:63-64).
Defendant subsequently met with detectives to share his information
(R. 204:66, 88). After first implicating two other people, defendant
confessed to killing Wally (R. 204:70-77, 89-105).
Defendant memorialized his confession in a signed statement to
police (R. 204:107-13).
Defendant then accompanied the police to Boulevard Market and reenacted the murder (R. 204:114-28).
Defendant's confessions and re-enactment of his crime were
consistent with the location of the shooting in the back room of the
store, with the location and severity of Wally's wounds, and with the
location of the glove print found on the store's column (R. 203:155,
167; R. 204:104,110-13, 114-25).
Analysis of the shorts defendant admitted wearing during the murder
indicated the presence of gun powder residue consistent with a
recently discharged firearm (R. 204:16-17, 50).
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13.

While incarcerated, defendant told a corrections officer, "someday
I'll get my hands on you and kill you like I did that other
motherfucker" (R. 205:45, 51).

In light of this evidence, defendant cannot show that the errors he now alleges,
even if they did occur, resulted in any harm to him. See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498,
501-02 (Utah 1986).
Consequently, defendant's cumulative error claim fails.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
conviction.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED H_ December 2002.

MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on\Je_December 2002,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to Randall W. Richards ,
Public Defender Association, Inc. of Weber County, 2568 Washington Boulevard, Suite
102, Ogden, Utah 84401, attorney for defendant.
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Addendum A

-UJenJ.,-

RANDALL W. RICHARDS #4503 of
WEBER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 399-4191

1
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
)

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE
OF COUNSEL

)

vs.
FRANK LYLE DOMINGUEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

) Case No. 20010649-CA

COMES NOW John T. Caine, and hereby enters his appearance as attorney of record
for the above named Defendant, Frank Lyle Domin
DATED this Z-

day of August, 200#

)ALL W. RICHARDS
Attbmey for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Appearance of Counsel to:
Weber County Attorney
2380 Washington Blvd, Second Floor
Ogden, UT 84401
Office of the Attorney General
160 E 300 S, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
r\
postage prepaid, on this _OL day of August, 2002.
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RANDALL W. RICHARDS #4503 of
WEBER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 399-4191
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

vs.

)
)

MOTION TO STRIKE ORAL
ARGUMENT AND PERMISSION
TO REBRIEF

)

FRANK LYLE DOMINGUEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

) Case No. 20010649-CA

COMES NOW the Appellant, above-named, by and through his attorney, Randall W.
Richards, and hereby moves this court to strike the Oral Argument currently set for Aug. 21,
2002, and to allow the Appellant to rebrief the case. This motion brought on the grounds
that new counsel has recently entered on this case, and after reviewing the brief submitted,
believes that the case needs further research and briefing. This is a case of a conviction of
Murder, a first-degree felony, and the best interest of justice requires additional briefing.
Counsel for die Appellant has contacted Karen A. Klucznik, attorney for Appellee, who has
agreed to stipulate to this motion.

DATED this "Z* day of August, 2002.'

)ALLW.
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Motion to Strike to:
Weber County Attorney
2380 Washington Bivd, Second Floor
Ogden, UT 84401
Office of the Attorney General
160 E 300 5,6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
postage prepaid, on this C2l day of August, 2002.
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ATTORNEY GENERAL
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KIRK TORGENSEN
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5 August 2002
Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Ut 84114-0230
Re: State v. Frank Lyle Dominguez
Case No. 20010649-CA
Dear Ms. Stagg:
This letter is to inform the Court that the State stipulates to defendant's
Motion to Strike Oral Argument and Permission to Rebrief filed 2 August 2002.
Very truly yours,

out** *» tHuc\^Jf
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
Assistant Attorney General

cc:

Randall W. Richards

160 EAST 300 SOUTH SIXT>. FLOOB • PMB ' 4 0 8 5 4 • SALT LAKS C'T»

UTAH
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FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

AUG 0 9 2002
Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

State of Utah,

ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 20010649-CA

v.
Frank Lyle Dominguez,
Defendant and Appellant,

This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion,
filed August 2, 2002, to strike oral argument and permission to
re-brief the case. Appellee stipulated to the motion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is granted. The oral
argument scheduled in this matter on August 21, 2002, at 9:30
a.m. is stricken and shall be rescheduled to a date yet to be
determined. Appellant's new brief is due within 30 days of the
date of this order.
Dated this *?

day of August, 2002.

FOR THE COURT:

ZZL

Judi€fT M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge

